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Favoring the Press 
Sonja R. West* 
In the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
US Supreme Court caught the nation’s attention by declaring that 
corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of 
money independently in political campaigns. The Court rested its five-to-
four decision in large part on a concept of speaker-based discrimination. 
In the Court’s words, “the Government may commit a constitutional wrong 
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.” 
To drive home its point that speaker-based distinctions are inherently 
problematic, the Court focused on one type of speaker distinction—the 
treatment of news media corporations. The Court began by asserting that 
allowing regulation of corporate speakers but not of non-corporate 
speakers would permit the government to limit the speech of media 
corporations—a thought that the majority called “dangerous, and 
unacceptable.” The campaign finance law in question, however, included 
an exemption for the news media, thus protecting the rights of the press. But 
the Court found the media exemption to be problematic because it treated 
some corporations differently than others. This favoritism of media 
corporations, in the Court’s view, would also amount to unconstitutional 
speaker discrimination. To the Citizens United majority, therefore, the news 
media corporation example settled the question on corporate speech rights. 
Under this example, a campaign finance law restricting corporate spending 
that exempted the news media would be unconstitutional speaker-based 
discrimination, but a law lacking such an exemption would open the door 
to regulation of the news media. 
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But was the Citizens United Court correct about the media 
corporation dilemma? Is the government no more able to regulate the 
expressive activities of Exxon Mobil Corporation than those of the New 
York Times Company? Must all speakers be treated uniformly whether or 
not they are members of the press? And does the First Amendment’s Press 
Clause (and not just the Speech Clause) play a role in this analysis? 
In this Article, I challenge the claim that the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from treating the press differently than other 
speakers. Rather than banning such distinctions, the Press Clause 
traditionally has supported differential treatment of the press. History, 
court precedent, and legislative practice, moreover, demonstrate how 
favoritism of press speakers has been condoned and often encouraged. 
This debate over the meaning of the Press Clause could have 
significant ramifications for the future of our free press. A jurisprudential 
drift of press rights away from protecting core press functions and toward 
constraining the government’s ability to recognize the unique role press 
speakers play in our democracy could significantly threaten the vital 
structural safeguards of the Fourth Estate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Merely suggest that the press receive different legal protections than other 
speakers, and one will quickly be met with cries of unfairness. Americans value 
equality and naturally recoil at the thought of some speakers receiving special 
treatment. 
This common resistance to treating the press differently than other types of 
speakers made a notable appearance in the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.1 In reaching its conclusion that corporations and unions 
could independently spend unlimited amounts of money in political campaigns, 
the US Supreme Court heavily emphasized how some media organizations have 
taken the corporate form. The Court explained that “[t]here is no precedent 
supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are 
deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not.”2 To do so, 
the Court declared, would constitute speaker discrimination.3 The Court then 
concluded that the government may not treat corporate speakers differently than 
other types of speakers; just as it cannot treat press speakers differently than non-
press speakers. 
The justices who joined together in Citizens United are part of a growing 
chorus of judges and scholars who argue that the First Amendment functions 
primarily as a nondiscrimination provision.4 The First Amendment free 
expression clauses state that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”5 And while the Citizens United majority 
relied on the Speech Clause,6 others have suggested that the Press Clause is the 
“more natural textual home” for this discussion. Under the nondiscrimination 
view, the Press Clause does not function as an active protector of the press, 
allowing (and perhaps demanding) government efforts that enable the news 
media to do their job. Rather, proponents of this view see the Press Clause as an 
obstacle to government regulations that grant special privileges to select speakers 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 352; see also id. (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional 
press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Other prominent advocates of this view include Professor Michael McConnell and Professor 
Eugene Volokh. See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 
123 YALE L.J. 412, 418 (2013) (arguing that the Press Clause protects the activity of “publishing 
information and opinions to the general public[,]” not a subset of speakers); Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 459, 538–39 (2012) (concluding that that the Press Clause guarantees “equal treatment to [all] 
speakers without regard to whether they are members of the press-as-industry”); see also Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1053 (2015) (suggesting that “the 
dominant understanding of the Press Clause has been that it protects a particular technology (the printing 
press) rather than a particular group of speakers (the institutional press)”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 6. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH? 40 (2012) (noting that the issue of the 
Press Clause was neither briefed nor argued in Citizens United). 
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including the news media. The right it secures, they argue, is simply the right of 
all speakers to be treated equally in their ability to publish speech. 
The nondiscrimination view of the Press Clause is deeply flawed for the 
simple reason that the press is different and has always been recognized as such. 
Unlike other speakers, the press dedicates significant time, resources, and 
expertise to the journalistic missions of checking the government and informing 
the citizenry on matters of public concern. While individual speakers might, at 
times, act in “press-like” ways, only the press is consistently devoted to these 
endeavors, which at their core strengthen our democracy by countering 
tendencies toward self-serving aristocracy and by aiding the public’s ability to 
responsibly participate in our system of self-government.7 
Recasting the Press Clause as a nondiscrimination provision is not only a 
dubious concept, but a dangerous one as well. Barring the government from 
recognizing the differences between press and non-press speakers threatens to 
undermine the vital role of the Fourth Estate.8 It also contradicts decades of 
Supreme Court precedent in which the Court has repeatedly celebrated the 
essential functions the press fulfills in our democracy. These functions include 
the press’s ability to serve as a check on the government and to inform the public 
on newsworthy matters.9 
For these reasons, the legislative practice of determining that the press 
should be favored in some contexts, so as to further a public good, dates back to 
the birth of the nation. Since then, federal and state legislatures, courts, and other 
government actors have adopted a wide range of regulations that provide the 
press with rights, privileges, and protections that are not granted to other 
speakers. These measures include testimonial privileges; enhanced protections 
from searches and seizures; procedural safeguards in certain types of litigation; 
special access to government-controlled places, information, or meetings; 
reduced fees; preferential postal rates; and exemptions from antitrust regulations 
as well as certain taxes.10 
At first glance, such laws might seem to provide some speakers with unfair 
advantages over other types of speakers. Specialized press freedoms, however, 
are not designed to balance individual rights of one speaker in relation to another. 
Rather, this differential approach is designed to safeguard the balance of power 
 
 7. See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2443–45 (2014) 
(discussing the government-checking function of the press and distinguishing “occasional public 
commentators”). 
 8. See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that the 
Court’s approach to cases involving the press “uniformly reflected its understanding that the Free Press 
guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution”). 
 9. See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 749–55 (2014) 
(describing the two main “unique constitutional functions” of the press as (1) news-gathering and 
dissemination, and (2) checking the government). 
 10. See, e.g., Jefferson Publ’g Corp. v. Forst, 234 S.E.2d 297, 300–01 (Va. 1977) (strictly 
construing a statutory sales tax exemption for publications other than newsstand sales). 
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between the people and their government. Press speakers are unique in the 
structural work they do to foster the flow of information regarding matters of 
public importance and to aid the public in monitoring the government and the 
powerful through shared knowledge. Providing unique legal protections for these 
speakers defends and enables this work. It is, therefore, entirely in keeping with 
the text, history, and spirit of the First Amendment’s Press Clause for the 
government to, at times, treat press speakers differently. 
In the following discussion, I consider the question of speaker-based 
classification of the press. It proceeds in four parts: in Part I, I introduce the 
current debate over the constitutionality of speaker discrimination under the First 
Amendment, including the Supreme Court’s reliance on identity-based 
discrimination in Citizens United. I also detail the rise of the concept of the Press 
Clause as a nondiscrimination provision and the recently popular argument that 
press freedom should be read as embracing nothing more than an “all speakers 
equal” liberty. 
In Part II, I highlight the incompatibility of this theory with our nation’s 
tradition of press freedom. In particular, I explore the varied ways in which 
courts and legislatures have acknowledged the press’s unique role throughout 
our nation’s history. In Part II.A, I review the historical evidence illustrating that 
a favored view of the press can be traced to the founding generation. In Part II.B, 
I survey America’s long and expansive tradition of preferential press treatment, 
including Supreme Court rulings that explicitly invite legislative actions 
favoring the press. 
After establishing our country’s strong relationship with press-favoring 
laws, I offer a critique in Part III of the idea that the Press Clause functions as a 
mere nondiscrimination provision. I dissect the logic behind the 
nondiscrimination view and conclude that it does not align with our existing 
jurisprudence of press freedom. Rather than lump the press together with other 
speakers, the Supreme Court has historically done just the opposite. In case after 
case, the Court has acknowledged and approved of government actions favoring 
the press. It has done so, moreover, in recognition of the press’s unique structural 
role in our democracy. 
I conclude in Part IV by examining the potential ramifications of continuing 
along the path of demanding speaker equality in relation to the press. By focusing 
on the connection between the press’s identity and function, I offer an alternative 
vision of how best to protect and strengthen the press in a way that honors its 
critical, but specialized, constitutional pedigree. 
The idea of press exceptionalism is not new. In fact, it is deeply embedded 
in our constitutional history and structure. Unlike other types of speakers, the 
press has its own text-based constitutional protection, a unique history of judicial 
and legislative recognition, and a distinctive policy-driven role that is central to 
meaningful self-governance. For all of these reasons, rather than fear preferential 
treatment of the press, Americans should embrace it. 
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I. 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SPEAKER CLASSIFICATIONS 
A. Citizens United and Speaker Discrimination 
In Citizens United,11 the Supreme Court caught the nation’s attention by 
declaring that corporations and unions have a First Amendment right to 
independently spend unlimited amounts of money in political campaigns. The 
Court rested its five-to-four decision on a concept of speaker-based 
discrimination. It violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the Court 
pronounced, for the government to limit corporate spending in political 
campaigns. 
Building on its earlier holdings that campaign contributions are a form of 
political speech, the Court held that legislatures may not limit the political speech 
of some speakers because of who (or what) they are. The Court likened speaker 
classifications to the First Amendment’s well-established suspicion of subject or 
viewpoint discrimination.12 It also made clear that speaker discrimination in and 
of itself is constitutionally problematic. “Quite apart from the purpose or effect 
of regulating content,” the Court stated, “the Government may commit a 
constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”13 
The Court’s claim that free speech doctrine generally prohibits speaker-
based classifications is striking—in large part because it is almost certainly 
incorrect.14 Contrary to the Court’s assertion, neither history nor Court precedent 
support the principle that speaker-based distinctions offend the First 
Amendment. In fact, in prior cases the Court has upheld differential treatment of 
speakers based on their identities as students,15 prisoners,16 members of the 
 
 11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 12. Id. at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands 
against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”) (citations omitted). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Whether the Court should recognize a constitutional prohibition on speaker classifications 
is a different question than whether established doctrine has included such a ban. See, e.g., Michael 
Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 781 
(2015) (arguing that the Court should declare a First Amendment ban on speaker-based discrimination, 
but admitting that prior to Citizens United “the Court had not previously said this clearly”); McConnell, 
supra note 4, at 447 (calling the Court’s theory on speaker discrimination “newly minted” and 
“overbroad”). 
 15. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that 
schools cannot regulate the speech of students “without evidence that is necessary to avoid material and 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline”). 
 16. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”). 
2018] FAVORING THE PRESS 97 
military,17 noncitizens,18 members of Congress,19 commercial advertisers,20 
attorneys,21 dissident unions,22 unpopular political candidates,23 terrorists,24 and 
federal employees.25 
While the Court has occasionally observed that differential treatment of 
speakers might indicate questionable governmental motivations, it has done so 
only to root out discrimination based on the content of speech—not 
discrimination based on the identity of the speaker alone.26 The central focus of 
 
 17. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“[T]he different character of the military 
community and of the military mission requires a different application of [First Amendment] 
protections.”). 
 18. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that it does not violate the 
First Amendment to deny visas to noncitizens who advocate or publish communist doctrine). 
 19. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (broadly interpreting the “privilege of 
legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say”). 
 20. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 35 (1999) (upholding 
a California statute that prohibited commercial speakers from accessing arrest records, but did allow 
access to speakers who wanted the information “for a scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental 
purpose”) (citation omitted); Va. State. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
760 (1976) (upholding a Virginia statute limiting licensed pharmacists’ ability to advertise drug prices). 
 21. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (“Particularly because the 
standards and conduct of state-licensed lawyers have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation 
by the States, it is all the more appropriate that we limit our scrutiny of state regulations to a level 
commensurate with the ‘subordinate position’ of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment 
values.”) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)). 
 22. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (holding 
that a school district did not violate the Constitution by denying access to some unions and not others). 
 23. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (finding that a state-
owned broadcaster’s decision to exclude a political candidate from a debate was constitutional as long 
as the candidate’s “objective lack of support, not his platform, was the criterion”). 
 24. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (finding no First Amendment 
problem with a federal statute that banned providing support for the lawful speech activities of groups 
designated as foreign terrorist organizations). 
 25. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”). 
 26. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“Our holding in Buckley 
does not support appellants’ broad assertion that all speaker-partial laws are presumed invalid. Rather, 
it stands for the proposition that speaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the 
Government’s preference for the substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what 
the disfavored speakers have to say).”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
548 (1983) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to differential tax treatment of veterans groups and 
other charitable organizations, but noting that the case would be different had there been any “indication 
that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had that effect”); see 
also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015) (“Characterizing a distinction as speaker 
based is only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.”); Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination 
Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 267 (2012) (“[S]peaker- and medium-based discrimination appears not 
to be suspect in itself. Only when a particular classification has a high correlation with subject-matter 
and viewpoint discrimination does the Court conclude that it should be treated with suspicion.”). 
98 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:91 
free speech protections has consistently remained on safeguarding speakers from 
government discrimination based on the content of their speech.27 
In the wake of Citizens United, a few commentators questioned the Court’s 
doctrinal shift toward prohibiting speaker classifications,28 while others 
expressed concern about possible future consequences of such a ruling.29 One 
lower court even concluded that the Citizens United dissenters’ view that some 
speaker classifications are constitutional was controlling.30 Even the Supreme 
Court itself seemed unsure how far its ban on speaker-based classifications 
should go. In Citizens United, for example, it explicitly reserved the question of 
whether bans on campaign spending by foreign nationals and governments 
would be unconstitutional, and later upheld such a speaker-based prohibition 
without explanation.31 
Nonetheless, the Court’s decision in Citizens United clearly hinged on the 
premise that speaker-based distinctions are constitutionally problematic.32 For 
purposes of this Article, however, let us set aside the larger question of whether 
a First Amendment issue arises whenever the government treats some speakers 
differently than others and instead focus on the type of speaker distinction the 
Court relied on to support its holding—the treatment of news media 
corporations. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996) (calling content-based protection the 
“keystone of First Amendment law”); see also ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 9 (2012) (“the 
cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence”) (citation omitted); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 
1304–05 (2006) (“the centerpiece of modern First Amendment doctrine”); Frederick Schauer, Towards 
an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270 (2005) (“the unalterable core of the 
First Amendment”). 
 28. See McConnell, supra note 4, at 448 (“In its Speech Clause decisions, the Court has been 
vigilant to prohibit discrimination on the basis of viewpoint and sometimes subject matter, but has never 
before placed speaker-based discrimination in the same suspect category.”) (citation omitted). 
 29. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 584 (2011) (“For example, it is unclear how, if the Court took its own broad pronouncements 
in Citizens United seriously, it could possibly sustain spending limits against foreign nationals and 
governments, who might seek to flood U.S. election campaigns with money.”). 
 30. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that “the Supreme 
Court has never squarely addressed the issue presented in this case, the only four [dissenting] justices 
who spoke to the question in Citizens United indicated that the government obviously has the power to 
bar foreign nationals from making campaign contributions and expenditures”). 
 31. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (“We need not reach the question 
whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from 
influencing our Nation’s political process.”). In Bluman v. FEC, however, the Court unanimously 
affirmed a lower court decision holding that the federal law barring foreign individuals from spending 
or contributing money in US election campaigns did not violate the First Amendment. 565 U.S. 1104 
(2012). 
 32. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that government 
reliance on speaker identity is “[t]he basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling”); Kagan, supra note 
14, at 781 (observing that speaker discrimination was “a central issue” in the Court’s holding in Citizens 
United). 
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The campaign finance law in Citizens United included an exemption for the 
news media.33 Yet the Court declined to rest its decision on this statutory 
provision.34 Instead, the Court held that the media exemption was 
unconstitutional.35 Having swept aside the media exemption, the Court then 
considered the law as though it applied to all corporations, including media 
corporations. The majority declared the thought that the government could limit 
the speech of media organizations to be “dangerous, and unacceptable,”36 and 
Justice Antonin Scalia said it “boggles the mind.”37 
Thus, to the Citizens United majority, the news media corporation example 
settled the question on corporate speech rights. Under this example, a campaign 
finance law restricting corporate spending that exempted the news media would 
be unconstitutional speaker-based discrimination, but a law lacking such an 
exemption would open the door to regulation of the news media.38 In dissent, 
Justice John Paul Stevens summed up the majority’s logic this way: 
[T]he legislature is thus damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. If 
the legislature gives media corporations an exemption from 
electioneering regulations that apply to other corporations, it violates the 
newly minted First Amendment rule against identity-based distinctions. 
 
 33. It is arguable, moreover, that the exemption covered the documentary film at the center of 
the case. See FEC, Advisory Opinion 2010-08, at 5 (June 11, 2010) (in which the FEC, six months after 
the Court’s decision in Citizens United, revisited its earlier advisory opinion and concluded that 
“Citizens United’s costs of producing and distributing its films, in addition to related marketing 
activities, are covered by the press exemption”). 
 34. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351–52 (“Media corporations are now exempt from § 
441b’s ban on corporate expenditures. Yet media corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the 
corporate form, the largest media corporations have ‘immense aggregations of wealth,’ and the views 
expressed by media corporations often ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support’ for those 
views. Thus, under the Government’s reasoning, wealthy media corporations could have their voices 
diminished to put them on par with other media entities. There is no precedent for permitting this under 
the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
 35. See id. at 352–53 (“[E]ven assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization 
has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a conglomerate that owns both a 
media business and an unrelated business to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall 
business interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical business interest but no 
media outlet in its ownership structure, would be forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same 
issue. This differential treatment cannot be squared with the First Amendment.”). 
 36. Id. at 351; see also id. at 353 (“There is simply no support for the view that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media 
corporations. . . . Yet television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations have 
become the most important means of mass communication in modern times. The First Amendment was 
certainly not understood to condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient 
media. . . . At the founding, speech was open, comprehensive, and vital to society’s definition of itself; 
there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 37. Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Sonja R. West, The Media Exemption Puzzle of 
Campaign Finance Laws, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 253 (2016) (discussing the Court’s reliance on 
both speaker discrimination and press freedom to invalidate a media exemption to a campaign finance 
law.). 
 38. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (“Differential treatment of . . . corporations . . . cannot 
be squared with the First Amendment”). 
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If the legislature does not give media corporations an exemption, it 
violates the First Amendment rights of the press. The only way out of 
this invented bind: no regulations whatsoever.39 
But, was the Citizens United Court correct about the media corporation 
dilemma on which its decision relied? Is the government no more able to regulate 
expressive activities of Exxon Mobil Corporation than it is of the New York 
Times Company? Must lawmakers treat all speakers identically, whether or not 
they are members of the press? 
In its analysis, the Citizens United majority focused on the Speech Clause. 
Writing for the four dissenters, however, Justice Stevens suggested that the 
media corporation problem could be resolved by simply reading a bit further 
along in the First Amendment to the Press Clause. The Press Clause, Justice 
Stevens argued, provides news organizations with special protection from 
government regulation, and its text and history demonstrate that not all identity-
based speech regulations violate the Constitution.40 Indeed, he noted, the 
Framers themselves drew “distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of 
‘speakers,’ or speech outlets or forms” by singling out the press for special 
protection.41 
In other words, whether or not the Speech Clause allows for identity-based 
distinctions, the Press Clause is a clear endorsement of speaker categorization 
when it comes to the press. The Press Clause tells us that the government 
historically has, can, and sometimes must treat the press differently than other 
types of speakers. 
B. The Press Clause is Not a Nondiscrimination Provision 
In a 2013 article, Professor Michael McConnell also turned to the Press 
Clause to analyze Citizens United.42 He suggested that the Court was mistaken 
in stating that the Speech Clause forbids all speaker-based distinctions, yet he 
also43 contended that the Press Clause does prohibit such classifications.44 To 
McConnell, the Speech Clause’s role is to prevent content-based discrimination, 
which still leaves room for identity-based groupings.45 On the other hand, he 
 
 39. Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 40. See id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The text and 
history . . . [of the Press Clause] suggest[] why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, 
might be able to claim special First Amendment status . . . .”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See McConnell, supra note 4. 
 43. See id. at 448 (“In its Speech Clause decisions, the Court has been vigilant to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint and sometimes subject matter, but has never before 
placed speaker-based discrimination in the same suspect category.”) (citation omitted). 
 44. Id. at 418. 
 45. Id. at 449 (“The Speech Clause comprises a variety of doctrines such as public forum, 
expressive conduct, time-place-and-manner restrictions, public employee speech, and neutrality in 
access to subsidies, which have not traditionally been thought to preclude all speaker-based 
distinctions.”). 
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suggested that the Press Clause’s job is to protect every speaker’s right “to 
disseminate information and opinion to the public through media of mass 
communication.”46 This task, he argued, does not leave room for speaker-based 
distinctions, at least when it comes to the use of newspapers and their functional 
equivalents.47 
McConnell’s argument is one of several recent versions of an increasingly 
popular view of the Press Clause as a nondiscrimination provision.48 This 
movement rejects the long-embraced view of the Press Clause as a repository of 
rights and protections for “the press”—traditionally known as speakers who 
fulfill unique constitutional functions such as informing the public and checking 
the government.49 Instead, proponents of the antidiscrimination interpretation 
see the freedom of the press as a mechanical extension of individual speech 
rights—a safeguard of everyone’s right to publish and disseminate their speech.50 
Advocates of the nondiscrimination interpretation are so confident in their 
view that they often dismiss any alternative approach as indefensible.51 Their 
arguments rest on multiple shared ideas. First, they see only two possible 
purposes of the Press Clause—it must be either an “all-speakers-equal,”52 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. (“The heart of the Press Clause is its prohibition on licensing; another way to express 
the prohibition on licensing is that the government may not pick and choose who can publish.”). 
 48. See Randall P. Bezanson, Whither Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1259–60 
(2012) (arguing that the Court in Citizens United and Professor Volokh have “reduced freedom of the 
press to nothing. . . . There is no press freedom because there is no press, constitutionally speaking”); 
Paul Horwitz, Institutional Actors in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REV. 809, 838 (2014) 
(“In Professor McConnell’s view of the Press Clause, however, the point is not that the institutional 
press receives any special protection. To the contrary, his point is that it receives no special protection.”); 
see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech, BYU L. REV. 1151, 
1157 (2015) (“[T]he most careful modern scholarship tends to confirm the view that the Press Clause 
was intended and has been understood to protect a particular technology: the printing press (as opposed 
to a favored group of speakers, the institutional press).”); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. 
L. REV. 309, 345 (2008) (“At its core, the freedom of the press was designed to protect speech 
technology.”); Christina Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the Press, 66 SMU L. 
REV. 157, 158 (2013) (discussing favorably the “press-as-technology” viewpoint); David B. Sentelle, 
Freedom of the Press: A Liberty for All or a Privilege for a Few?, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 29 
(2014) (“[I]t seems most likely that the public would have understood ‘the press’ to be referring to all 
writings, by all citizens, not just those by an elite group that did not even exist in 1791”). 
 49. But see David A. Anderson, Response, The Press and Democratic Dialogue, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 331, 334 (2014) (“The case for enforcing the press clause is not dependent on any belief that 
the press is unique. . . . It is enough that the press is one of the entities that usefully serve these functions, 
and is the one the Framers saw fit to recognize. Protecting them all would be impossible, and protecting 
none would be intolerable.”). 
 50. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 390 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“It is 
passing strange to interpret the phrase ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press’ to mean, not everyone’s 
right to speak or publish, but rather everyone’s right to speak or the institutional press’s right to 
publish.”). 
 51. See Volokh, supra note 4, at 465 (arguing that any other conclusion would require reliance 
on “sources other than text, original meaning, tradition, and precedent for support”). 
 52. See id. at 505 (“The freedom of speech, or of the press, the theory goes, provides the same 
protection for the rights to speak, write, and print.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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nondiscrimination clause or a source of special rights reserved only for the 
“institutional press.”53 They also contend that even if the Press Clause involves 
a more select group of constitutional rights-holders, the task of determining who 
is or is not the press is impossible.54 For textual and historical support, they have 
rallied around Professor Eugene Volokh’s analysis in a 2012 article claiming 
that, as a matter of originalist interpretation, the Press Clause “protects 
everyone’s use of the printing press (and its modern equivalents) as a 
technology.”55 And, finally, proponents of the nondiscrimination interpretation 
stress that Supreme Court precedent is on their side, echoing the words of the 
Citizens United majority that the Court has “consistently rejected the proposition 
that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other 
speakers.”56 
In other articles, I have challenged these points, including: the historical 
and textual argument that the Press Clause only protects the technology of the 
printing press;57 the claim that the only potential constitutional rights holders 
under the Press Clause are the “institutional” press;58 the allegation that defining 
the “press” is inherently unworkable;59 and the Supreme Court’s purported track 
record of treating the press like other speakers.60 In this Article, however, I focus 
specifically on the suggestion that the Press Clause functions as a 
nondiscrimination provision that prohibits speaker-based classifications by the 
government. 
 
 53. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that 
the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”); McConnell, 
supra note 4, at 418 (“[T]he dispositive question becomes whether the protections of the Press Clause 
are confined to a certain set of actors, namely the institutional press (however defined), or whether it 
protects an activity: publishing information and opinions to the general public.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Volokh, supra note 4, at 463 (“Under [Citizen United’s] approach, the First Amendment rights 
of the institutional press and of other speakers rise and fall together.”). 
 54. See McConnell, supra note 4, at 418 (arguing that defining the press “requires a legally 
enforceable line between ‘press’ and others, which is inherently unworkable and probably would not 
even produce a different result in Citizens United itself”). 
 55. Volokh, supra note 4, at 462 (emphasis omitted); see also Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1260 
(suggesting that Volokh’s press-as-technology view “can no longer be said to be an emerging revolution, 
but an accomplished one”); McConnell, supra note 4, at 441 (arguing that the Press Clause only protects 
“the right of any person to use the technology of the press to disseminate opinions”). 
 56. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting)); see also id. (“There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt 
to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those 
which are not.”). 
 57. See generally Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016) 
(expanding the scope of relevant historical evidence and evaluating the founding generation’s view of 
the Press Clause). 
 58. See generally West, supra note 7 (arguing in favor of a narrow, functional definition of the 
term “press”). 
 59. See id. (suggesting a “holistic approach” to defining the press). 
 60. See generally West, supra note 9 (contending that the Court has recognized the press as 
different from other speakers). 
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A threshold inquiry to this discussion is the sometimes vexing question of 
who or what is the “press.” To many observers, the freedom of the press merely 
protects an activity—the individual right to publish and disseminate speech. One 
problem with this interpretation is that the Speech Clause already protects rights 
to receive and disseminate speech.61 Another popular definition is that the 
“press” is a technology. Thus, press freedom originally secured speakers’ right 
to use the printing press and today secures speakers’ right to use mass 
communication technology. Yet publishing speech via mass communication 
technology is already covered by the Court’s interpretation of the freedom of 
speech.62 Both of these interpretations of the “press” are thus problematic 
because they relegate the Press Clause to a constitutional redundancy.63 
Perhaps more importantly, however, both of these views fail to adequately 
reflect the historical evidence of the original purpose of press freedom, which 
was to provide structural protection of the Republic through an informed 
citizenry and a closely scrutinized government.64 The Press Clause is thus best 
viewed as a safeguard for these unique press functions as opposed to simply a 
generic right of all individuals to disseminate their messages. To protect those 
unique functions, moreover, we must identify the speakers who are most 
effectively acting as government watchdogs and public informants.65 I have 
previously proposed developing a functional definition to determine which 
speakers fulfill these roles.66 And, while I do not claim to have perfected a test, 
I suggest that such a determination is possible and consistent with how the Court 
has handled other situations in which it needed to identify a subset of 
constitutional rights holders.67 
 
 61. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (referring to the constitutional right of 
adults “to receive [speech] and to address to one another”); Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (explaining that freedom of speech is “afforded . . . 
to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 390 (1969) (stating that the freedom of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) (holding that 
regulations limiting cable operators’ ability to transmit their programs was a violation of the freedom of 
speech, not the freedom of the press); Reno, 521 U.S. at 849 (holding that regulations on speakers’ rights 
to publish sexually oriented material on the Internet violated the freedom of speech, not the freedom of 
the press). 
 63. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that 
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”). 
 64. See generally West, supra note 57, at 62–71. 
 65. See generally West, supra note 7; see also West, supra note 9, at 750 (reviewing Supreme 
Court precedent and identifying the two primary constitutional functions of the press: (1) gathering and 
disseminating news to the public and (2) providing a check on the government and the powerful). 
 66. West, supra note 7, at 2455–62 (suggesting guidelines for identifying press speakers for 
purposes of the Press Clause). 
 67. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) 
(applying a functional inquiry into who was a “minister” for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause); 
Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1058–60 (2011) (discussing the 
role of the Speech Clause as a “fallback protections” for the Press Clause). 
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This discussion, moreover, does not take on the more formidable challenge 
of defining the press for purposes of recognizing unique constitutional rights. 
Instead, it considers state and federal lawmakers’ longstanding practice of 
crafting specific laws and regulations (such as reporters’ shield laws or access 
rights) that apply to the speakers they have identified as the most appropriate 
recipients of such benefits. In particular, I argue in this Article that the Press 
Clause should be interpreted as supporting the government’s ability to recognize 
such speakers and to create necessary legal safeguards to protect their work 
rather than bringing such laws into constitutional doubt. 
The point on which my argument converges with Professor McConnell’s is 
that the issue the Court considered in Citizens United should have been analyzed 
under the Press Clause rather than the Speech Clause. As McConnell has pointed 
out, there is little support for the Court’s suggestion that speaker-based 
classifications categorically infringe upon the Speech Clause. He also cautioned 
that adopting the Court’s theory about identity-based distinctions under the 
Speech Clause could lead to “wider, and perhaps unforeseeable, implications.” 
He argued correctly that analyzing the Citizens United case under the Press 
Clause avoids these problems. 
Our views diverge, however, as to why the Press Clause is useful to the 
Court’s analysis. Professor McConnell claims that the Press Clause, unlike the 
Speech Clause, does prohibit speaker-based discrimination for two reasons. 
First, he argues that the Press Clause stands for the principle that “the 
government may not pick and choose who can publish.”68 Second, he suggests 
that a Press Clause ban on identity-based regulations would neutralize the 
troublingly “far-reaching consequences” of the Court’s Speech Clause rule.69 
I believe that both of these arguments are incorrect. First is the suggestion 
that the Press Clause—and not the Speech Clause—prohibits speaker 
classifications because it simply protects a speaker’s right to publish. As 
mentioned above, limiting the role of the Press Clause to protecting only the right 
to publish allows it to be entirely absorbed by the Speech Clause’s protection of 
a speaker’s right to reach their audience. Doing so further denies the Press Clause 
the opportunity to fulfill its independent structural tasks of ensuring that the 
public is informed and the government is monitored. Declaring that it is the Press 
Clause (and not the Speech Clause) that forbids speaker classifications, 
moreover, ignores the historical evidence that the framing generation envisioned 
identity-based distinctions under the Press Clause, which is far stronger than any 
such evidence regarding the Speech Clause. The Press Clause has never 
functioned as a ban on speaker distinctions; rather, it traditionally has worked in 
support of differential treatment for the press. 
 
 68. McConnell, supra note 4, at 449. 
 69. Id. at 417. 
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To McConnell’s second point, the potential ramifications of treating the 
Press Clause as a nondiscrimination provision are deeply problematic. In Part II, 
I discuss the numerous and wide-ranging laws and regulations that lawmakers 
have enacted to single out the press for special treatment. Adopting a 
nondiscrimination view of the Press Clause places them all in doubt. A 
jurisprudential drift of the freedom of press away from protecting core 
constitutional press functions and toward constraining the government’s ability 
to recognize the unique role of the press threatens the basic structure of the 
Fourth Estate. 
Nevertheless, I agree that whether the media exemption to the campaign 
finance law at issue in Citizens United constituted unconstitutional speaker-
based classification should have been analyzed under the Press Clause. It is, as 
Justice Stevens observed, “a more natural textual home”70 for this discussion 
than the Speech Clause. And because the preferential treatment of media 
corporations played such a key role in the majority’s logic, it is especially 
important to explore fully whether a media exemption to the campaign finance 
regulations actually offended the First Amendment.71 
In the following discussion, I examine the relationship between press 
freedoms and speaker classifications. This review of history, precedent, and 
longstanding legislative practice shows that our constitutional tradition not only 
condones different and preferential treatment of the press but actively endorses 
it. 
II. 
THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF PRESS FAVORITISM 
A. The History of Press Favoritism 
The Court in Citizens United claimed that it was relying on “ancient First 
Amendment principles,”72 “history,” and the Speech Clause “as originally 
understood” to support the conclusion that “differential treatment [of media 
corporations] cannot be squared with the First Amendment.”73 In fact, however, 
the majority’s historical analysis is extremely thin. Particularly notable is the 
lack of any evidence in the majority opinion supporting the claim that the 
 
 70. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 431 n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 71. The Supreme Court, however, has long focused the lion’s share of its attention on the Speech 
Clause, while generally overlooking the Press Clause. See West, supra note 7, at 2439 (describing the 
Speech Clause as the Court’s “favorite child” and the Press Clause as “the neglected one”). Thus, most 
of its decisions affecting the press are framed as questions about freedom of speech. The analysis in this 
Article, therefore, will consider both speech and press rights, but its ultimate conclusion is that the Press 
Clause works in support of differing protections for the press. 
 72. 558 U.S. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 352–53. 
106 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:91 
Framers disapproved of the government’s use of speaker classifications in 
matters involving the press.74 
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens pointed to the majority’s failure to offer 
original meaning evidence, and noted that “[t]o the extent that the Framers’ 
views are discernible and relevant to the disposition of this case, they would 
appear to cut strongly against the majority’s position.”75 Justice Stevens is 
correct. Historical evidence shows that the framing generation openly endorsed 
uniquely favorable treatment of the press, an endorsement based on a structural 
concept of the capacity of the press to equalize the influence wielded by the 
public and by other powerful actors. 
When discussing the founding generation’s treatment of the media, the 
Citizens United Court focused only on a hypothetical scenario in which Congress 
had not exempted the news media from its campaign finance regulation. Such 
regulation of the press, the justices suggested, would violate the Constitution.76 
On this point, I certainly agree. There would be serious First Amendment 
concerns if the law had not included a media exemption, or if the media 
exemption were too narrowly drawn.77 
But, in Citizens United, the law did include a media exemption. And the 
exemption is where the issue of potential speaker discrimination comes in. The 
Court contended that giving preferential treatment to media corporations is 
unconstitutional,78 calling it “the most doubtful proposition that a news 
organization has a right to speak when others do not.”79 The Court, however, did 
not offer any historical evidence implying that the framing generation frowned 
 
 74. See id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “there is 
not a scintilla of evidence” to support the majority’s original understanding of the First Amendment). 
But see id. at 353–54 (“The Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or forms of 
communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and media are entitled to less First 
Amendment protection than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of 
communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”); id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Historical evidence relating to the textually similar clause ‘the freedom of the press’ also provides no 
support for the proposition that the First Amendment excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from 
the scope of its protection.”) (alteration omitted). 
 75. Id. at 426. 
 76. Id. at 353 (“The First Amendment was certainly not understood [by the Framers] to condone 
the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient media.”). 
 77. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (holding that it violated the First 
Amendment for a state to punish a newspaper for publishing an editorial on election day urging citizens 
to vote a particular way, and observing that “[s]uppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize 
governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very 
agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoroughly and deliberately selected to improve our society 
and keep it free”); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press in 
Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) (arguing that a broadly 
defined media exemption is constitutionally required). 
 78. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (“There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt 
to distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those 
which are not.”). 
 79. Id. 
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on preferential treatment for press speakers. If the First Amendment generally—
or the Press Clause specifically—is truly based on antidiscrimination principles, 
there should be some indication of early opposition to acts of press favoritism. 
Yet there is no such evidence. In fact, historical evidence suggests that members 
of the founding generation were quite comfortable granting the press special 
benefits. 
1. The Original and Special Status of Press Freedom 
Historical evidence from the founding era shows that the Framers 
considered press freedom to be of vital importance.80 James Madison declared 
the liberty of the press to be “one of the great bulwarks of liberty”81 and 
“essential to the security of freedom in a state.”82 It was, he said, among the 
“choicest privileges of the people”83 and should be considered “inviolable.”84 
John Adams likewise proclaimed that “[a] free press maintains the majesty of 
the people.”85 Indeed, press historians have concluded that press freedom was “a 
matter of widespread concern”86 to the framing generation and “was everywhere 
a grand topic for declamation.”87 
Not only did early Americans value press freedom, but historical evidence 
suggests that they treasured it even beyond the freedom of speech.88 Professor 
David Anderson explained how press freedom originally took precedence over 
speech rights in his influential article, The Origins of the Press Clause. In that 
article, Anderson traced the evolution of the clause through pre-Revolutionary 
and founding-era documents. This evidence, he concluded, shows that “the press 
clause was primary and the speech clause secondary” in importance and that 
speech rights evolved only later “as an offshoot of freedom of the press” and 
freedom of religion.89 Indeed, most early state declarations of rights mentioned 
 
 80. See West, supra note 57, at 62 (“Despite the lack of consensus about the specific meaning 
of the Press Clause, one thing is certain: Press freedom was of paramount importance at the time of the 
framing.”). 
 81. JOSEPH GALES, THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 451 (1834). 
 82. MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI (1780), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 339, 342 (1971). 
 83. JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM 166 (1988) (quoting Letter from James 
Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 380 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)). 
 84. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 83, at 377). 
 85. WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT 153 (2016) (quoting JOHN ADAMS, 
A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765)). 
 86. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983). 
 87. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 214–15 (1960). 
 88. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 508 (“The textual antecedents of the first amendment reflect 
a greater concern with press than with speech.”). 
 89. Id. at 487. 
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only the freedom of the press and did not make any reference to speech rights.90 
This evidence contradicts the nondiscrimination view of the Press Clause as 
merely an extension of individual speech rights. 
Historical evidence, therefore, establishes that members of the founding 
generation placed the liberty of the press in a special and uniquely significant 
category. We also learn from the historical evidence that the framing generation 
valued press freedom in large part because of the important structural role the 
press plays in our democracy. The Founders viewed a free press as vital to the 
country’s survival by checking government tyranny and corruption and by 
monitoring laws and public policies through an informed citizenry.91 
There is also early evidence that the Framers embraced press freedom to 
serve another important public interest—balancing the influence of the 
“aristocrats who would control Congress” and “ordinary people.”92 One way that 
we know that the Framers viewed the freedom of the press as a tool for 
combatting the ability of the wealthy to gain control of the public debate and, in 
turn, political power is through their views of printers. Members of the ratifying 
generation placed great expectations of duty onto the publishers, and were also 
comfortable providing them with favorable treatment.93 
In many ways, early Americans viewed printers as public servants who 
worked to amplify voices that might not otherwise be heard. While the 
government did not support content-based regulations of the press, the public 
expected its printers to amplify a variety of voices.94 In a 1782 newspaper 
editorial, for example, the author explained that “[a] printer is in this country a 
sort of public officer, and in that character has a special protection.”95 Often the 
debate focused on printers’ obligation to publish opposing political viewpoints. 
Benjamin Franklin promoted this idea in 1731 in his article “Apology for 
Printers,” in which he wrote, “Printers are educated in the Belief, that when Men 
differ in Opinion, both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard 
by the Publick.”96 
 
 90. See West, supra note 57, at 63–64 (discussing the importance of press freedom to the 
Founders). 
 91. Id. at 67–71 (explaining the Founders’ emphasis on the “structural function” of the press). 
 92. See AKHIL REED AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 10, 21 (1998) 
(observing that the First Amendment’s “historical and structural core was to safeguard the rights of 
popular majorities (like the Republicans of the late 1790s) against a possibly unrepresentative and self-
interested Congress”); id. at 10–11 (describing the Anti-Federalists’ concerns of creating an aristocratic 
government.). 
 93. I am grateful to Bill Vander Lugt for his insights into this concept. 
 94. See generally West, supra note 57, at 86–88 (discussing views of early printers as public 
servants.). 
 95. Sidney, Editorial, FREEMAN’S J., Apr. 10, 1782, available at America’s Historical 
Newspapers, 1690–1876 (NewsBank, Inc. 2017). 
 96. Benjamin Franklin, Apology for Printers, PA. GAZETTE, June 10, 1731, reprinted in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 194–99 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1959). 
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While the press was praised when it was seen as presenting multiple points 
of view, it was likewise heavily criticized when it was deemed to have come 
under the control of powerful political parties or wealthy individuals. For 
example, Thomas Jefferson’s reputation was severely damaged after it was 
disclosed in 1792 that he had hired a newspaper editor as a “government 
translator.”97 The alliance between a government actor and a member of the press 
triggered the ratifying generation’s fear of coercion by the economically 
powerful—coercion that the press was meant to guard against.98 As historian 
Jeffrey Pasley explained: 
The standard scenario in which Americans imagined liberty being 
destroyed called for an ambitious leader or ‘junto’ of leaders to recruit 
a loyal corps of helpers, men whose loyalties were to their leader rather 
than the community as a whole . . . . These subverters of liberty could 
come in many forms: a warlord’s private army, a classical dictator’s 
Praetorian Guard, or the parliamentary pensioners and hireling 
newspaper editors of Britain.99 
Early Americans saw the press as playing a crucial structural role in our 
democratic debate that functioned as a counter-balance to the voices of the 
wealthy and powerful. The press has always occupied a special place in the heart 
of our constitutional democracy. The founding generation, in fact, viewed the 
importance of press freedom as different from, and at times even more important 
than, basic speech rights. Historically, we have treated the press as special 
because of the structural roles it fills. 
2. The Early Practice of Press Favoritism 
The early reverence for the unique structural role of the press was more 
than just talk. The founding generation also practiced press favoritism. The 
primary example of this early embrace of special press rights can be found in the 
development of the United States Post Office. According to Professor Anju C. 
Desai, government actors openly encouraged and fought for privileged benefits 
for the press during the formation and growth of the Post Office.100 This history, 
he noted, “raises serious questions about First Amendment theories that call for 
an arm’s length relationship between government and the press.”101 Thus, as 
 
 97. See JEFFREY L. PASLEY, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (2001). 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Professor Desai has argued that the history of the Post Office is an important source of 
information about the Press Clause that has been “virtually ignored by First Amendment scholars even 
those whose work explores the historical origins of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.” Anuj C. 
Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped 
Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 689 (2007). 
 101. Id. at 688. 
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Desai rightly observed, “any First Amendment theory based on originalism . . . 
must contend with this intertwined relationship.”102 
The Framers believed that the free flow of information was critical to the 
unity of the country’s citizenry and that “a conduit for political information was 
a necessary condition for maintenance of a democracy over such a 
geographically dispersed area.”103 To accomplish this, they turned to newspapers 
for information and to the Post Office for distribution. James Madison explained 
in a 1791 essay in the National Gazette that “[w]hatever facilitates a general 
intercourse of sentiments, as good roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and 
particularly a circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people, 
. . . is favorable to liberty, where [the geographical reach of the nation otherwise] 
may be too extensive.”104 
The decision to use the national Post Office to spread news was no 
historical accident, according to Desai, but the result of “a substantial amount of 
conscious government policy.”105 The Framers were unusually unified in their 
support of the plan.106 Even political opponents who were typically at odds over 
matters of government policy agreed that the best way to improve public 
knowledge was by circulating newspapers via the Post Office.107 To these early 
government officials, not all types of communication were equal. Rather, they 
saw newspapers as occupying a special place.108 Government officials expressed 
their unique favoritism of the press by granting substantial subsidies for the 
shipment of newspapers.109 
The unique status of newspapers played a central role in the congressional 
debates leading to the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792. It is especially 
noteworthy that this debate was not about whether to give preferential treatment 
to newspapers, but about how much preferential treatment to give them.110 The 
congressmen ultimately agreed to allow all newspapers access to the postal 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 686; see also THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 29 (Dagobert D. Runes 
ed., 1947) (“For the purpose of diffusing knowledge, as well as extending the living principle of 
government to every part of the United States; every state—city—county—village—and township in 
the union, should be tied together by means of the post-office.—This is the true non-electric wire of 
government.”). 
 104. James Madison, Public Opinion, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1791, reprinted in 14 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 170 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). 
 105. Desai, supra note 100, at 672. 
 106. See id. at 692–93. 
 107. Id. at 693. 
 108. See id. at 680 (discussing the relationship between newspapers and the postal service in the 
eighteenth century). 
 109. See George Washington, President, Fourth Annual Address to the United States Senate and 
House of Representatives (Nov. 6, 1792) (“It is represented that some provisions in the law which 
establishes the post office operate, in experiment, against the transmission of news papers to distant parts 
of the country. Should this, upon due inquiry, be found to be the fact, a full conviction of the importance 
of facilitating the circulation of political intelligence and information will, I doubt not, lead to the 
application of a remedy.”). 
 110. See Desai, supra note 100, at 692–93. 
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system at “rates that were both far below those of ordinary letters and below the 
actual cost of delivery.”111 The result was a system under which newspaper 
publishers mailed their papers to subscribers at a rate that was heavily subsidized 
by other non-press speakers, such as merchants and personal letter writers, who 
paid a higher price to send their missives.112 
The Post Office Act’s subsidized postal rate for newspapers demonstrates 
the early acceptance of government favoritism of the press over other speakers. 
Congressional embrace of speaker-based classifications favoring the press, 
however, did not mean that early congressmen were comfortable with laws that 
involved content-based discrimination. These same congressmen, for example, 
rejected a proposal to reduce the burden on the postal system by allowing only 
some newspapers to use the mail service. They rejected the proposal out of fear 
“that such a policy would be used discriminatorily and would effectively amount 
to a federal subsidy for the government’s supporters in the press.”113 
Not only did the early Congress treat newspaper publishers more favorably 
than other types of speakers, it also gave preferential treatment to certain 
subgroups of the press—notably smaller, rural newspapers—in an effort to 
support the functional role of these papers in servicing certain communities. 
With this goal, Congress passed regulations that were specifically designed to 
help less profitable, rural newspapers compete with their wealthier urban 
counterparts.114 Historical evidence reveals that smaller, rural newspapers “were 
the special darlings of Congress, whose policies were deliberately designed to 
foster them and make them competitive with city newspapers” and “to protect 
them against the encroachments of the urban press.”115 In other words, contrary 
to the assertions of the Citizens United majority, early government policy makers 
embraced the idea that some speakers, even press speakers, “could have their 
voices diminished to put them on par with other media entities.”116 
These overt actions by Congress favoring the press over other speakers 
were not simply historical anomalies or examples of an overlooked yet still 
unconstitutional act. They were, rather, a closely examined and acknowledged 
legislative power. In the 1913 case Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, for example, 
the Supreme Court explicitly considered Congress’s power to treat the press 
differently than other speakers through the development of the postal service.117 
The Court found that there was “no doubt that from the beginning[,] Congress, 
 
 111. Id. at 693. 
 112. Id. at 694. 
 113. Id. at 691. 
 114. Id. at 693–94. 
 115. WAYNE E. FULLER, THE AMERICAN MAIL: ENLARGER OF THE COMMON LIFE 113 (Daniel 
J. Boorstin ed., 1972). 
 116. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010). 
 117. Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 301 (1913). 
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in exerting the power to establish post-offices and post-roads, has acted upon the 
assumption that it was not bound by any hard and fast rule of uniformity . . . .”118 
Focusing specifically on Congress’s ability to provide newspapers with 
lower postal rates, the Lewis Publishing Court reviewed the history of the Post 
Office Act and found that Congress was always free to favor the press.119 This 
power, moreover, “rested upon broad principles of public policy” under which 
Congress could decide “how far it was wise for the general welfare to give 
advantages to one class not enjoyed by another.”120 The Court reached this 
holding while openly acknowledging that this meant Congress had the power to 
discriminate against non-press speakers. Indeed, it stated that Congress had the 
power to favor the press even though such a law “apparently seriously 
discriminates against the public and in favor of newspapers, periodicals, etc., and 
their publishers.”121 This serious discrimination was allowable, the Court further 
held, despite the fact that this favoritism bestowed upon newspaper publishers 
great economic and other advantages that “undoubtedly operated a very great 
discrimination in their favor.”122 
The actions of early federal lawmakers in creating postal subsidies for 
newspaper publishers, as well as the Supreme Court’s acceptance of that power, 
confirms what the early history of the nation suggests—namely that lawmakers 
could and did engage openly in speaker-based classifications in favor of the 
press. 
B. The Precedent and Practice of Press Favoritism 
The historical evidence suggests that early Americans were not opposed to 
speaker-based classifications favoring the press. In fact, they supported special 
rules as means to further the valuable structural functions the press fulfills. This 
tradition of press favoritism has continued and grown. 
Indeed, more than a hundred years of court precedent as well as state and 
federal legislation refute an interpretation of the Press Clause as a constitutional 
prohibition on speaker-based discrimination. Rather than invalidating any 
government action that treats press speakers differently from other speakers, the 
courts have consistently allowed—and often encouraged—just such distinctions. 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 302 (“[I]t was always conceived not only that Congress might so exert its power as to 
favor the circulation of newspapers, by giving special mail advantages . . . .”). 
 120. Id. at 303. 
 121. Id. at 313; see also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 
255 U.S. 407, 410 (1921) (noting the preferential postal rates are “a frank extension of special favors to 
publishers because of the special contribution to the public welfare which Congress believes is derived 
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 122. Lewis Publ’g Co., 229 U.S. at 303–04; see also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 
157 (1946) (holding that the US Postal Service could not withdraw a publication’s mail permit based on 
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State and federal lawmakers, meanwhile, have both implicitly and explicitly 
approved of speaker categorization by enacting special protections for the press. 
1. The Supreme Court Has Endorsed Laws Favoring the Press 
The clearest evidence that special rights and protections for the press are 
not constitutionally prohibited can be found in the words of the Supreme Court 
itself. On many occasions, the Court has explicitly endorsed legislative 
protection for the press. 
Perhaps most notable is the landmark 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes.123 
Branzburg is most widely known for the holding that journalists do not have a 
constitutionally mandated testimonial privilege. Justice Byron White authored 
the opinion of the Court and refused to recognize a First Amendment protection 
for reporters who were subpoenaed to testify in front of a grand jury about their 
confidential sources.124 Yet, while holding that the Constitution did not require 
a reporter’s privilege in that instance, Justice White made clear that it also did 
not prohibit such a privilege if legislatively granted. 
In fact, Justice White affirmatively encouraged legislators to decide for 
themselves whether to provide this form of extra protections for the press. He 
contended that legislators are better situated than courts to evaluate the need for 
special rights. At the federal level, he explained, “Congress has freedom to 
determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable 
and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to 
deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as 
experience from time to time may dictate.” He likewise suggested that the same 
is true for state legislatures, which are “free, within First Amendment limits, to 
fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect 
to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own 
areas.”125 
An argument that the First Amendment prohibits differential treatment of 
press speakers is completely contradictory to this holding in Branzburg. If there 
were such a constitutional ban, it would, of course, supersede any law enacted 
by federal or state legislatures. A constitutional rule prohibiting preferential press 
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treatment, moreover, would also be supreme over a state constitutional provision 
providing such advantages. Yet, the Court in Branzburg declared just the 
opposite, stating that it “goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to 
bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own 
constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s privilege, either qualified or 
absolute.”126 
Branzburg is not the only example of the Supreme Court explicitly 
approving legislative protections for the press. For example, the plurality in 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.127 denied a constitutional right for journalists to have 
access to county jails beyond the access granted all other persons. The Court, 
however, recognized a legislative power to provide for such additional access. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger captured this endorsement, calling the journalists’ 
argument for a constitutional access right flawed, “because it invites the Court 
to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has 
left to the political processes.”128 He later reiterated that the power to grant 
special media access to jails or prisons lies with the legislatures, stating that 
“until the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the media 
have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different from or 
greater than that accorded the public generally.”129 And in Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, a case involving both First and Fourth Amendment rights, the Court found 
no constitutional problem with government searches of newsrooms.130 But it 
went on to note that the Constitution did “not prevent or advise against legislative 
or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections.”131 
Lower court judges have echoed the Supreme Court’s approval of 
legislative protections directed at the press. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller,132 a reporter and a publisher appealed contempt orders directed at them 
after they refused to reveal the names of their sources in response to grand jury 
subpoenas. The D.C. Circuit found that the First Amendment did not protect 
them from testifying. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge David Sentelle 
noted that key questions regarding a privilege, such as its scope and to whom it 
would apply, “smack[s] of legislation more than adjudication[.]”133 He advised 
members of the media advocating for such a right to “address those concerns to 
the Article I legislative branch for presentment to the Article II executive [rather] 
than to the Article III courts.”134 
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A variety of other federal courts have also reached the conclusion that 
legislatures are better situated to create protections for the press. The Fourth 
Circuit stated that Congress “can more effectively and comprehensively weigh 
the policy arguments for and against adopting a privilege and define its scope.”135 
Other federal courts have stressed that giving the press special status serves 
important public policies. These include protecting “the vital communication 
role played by the press in a free society”136 and “a paramount public interest in 
the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of 
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest 
which has always been a principal concern of the First Amendment.”137 A long 
line of federal cases supports the proposition that the press may plead their case 
for special treatment to the legislatures.138 
2. Numerous Laws Grant the Press Special Rights and Protections 
Another indication that laws privileging the press are constitutional is the 
sheer number of them that have been enacted—none of which has been found to 
involve unconstitutional speaker discrimination. The quantity, breadth, and 
longevity of laws benefiting the press139 are difficult to square with the view that 
such differing treatment violates the First Amendment. 
The majority of states, for example, have enacted shield laws that provide 
varying degrees of protection for the press.140 Although many of these laws have 
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been enacted since Branzburg, state legislative protection for the press has been 
going on for over a century. Maryland enacted the first state shield law in 1896, 
in response to the jailing of two reporters who refused to reveal their confidential 
sources to a Senate committee.141 Ten other states followed suit in the 1930s.142 
Since the 1970s, most states have passed shield statutes, bringing the total 
number of states with statutory protection for the press to thirty-nine, along with 
the District of Columbia.143 
A variety of other state laws give the press special legal protections. 
Examples of such protections include: an opportunity for the media to provide 
evidence of mitigation for actions of defamation or libel,144 an opportunity for 
the media to publish a correction prior to an action for libel or slander,145 
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damages); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-103 (West 2017) (plaintiff may not recover punitive damages if 
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restrictions on search warrants146 and seizures,147 an additional notice 
requirement,148 special requirements for subpoenas of media witnesses,149 and 
assurances that publication of a source shall not be considered a waiver of any 
protections provided by the state’s shield statute.150 Still more state laws give the 
press additional privileges that other speakers do not enjoy, such as special 
access to inmates,151 to arrest records,152 and to reduced fees.153 
Another noteworthy example of legislators enacting laws to protect the 
press arose after the 1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily in which the 
Supreme Court held that there was no First Amendment defense to government 
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searches of newsrooms.154 In direct response, Congress passed the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980, which limited the government’s ability to search or seize 
the work product of “a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to 
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of 
public communication.”155 
Through their press-favoring laws, legislators have shown an interest in 
protecting not only the press’s acts of newsgathering and reporting, but also its 
economic stability as a means to ensure its independence. Almost 200 years after 
the early Congress enacted favorable postal rates for the press, for example, 
Congress again passed a major piece of legislation with the explicit purpose of 
preserving the nation’s newspapers. 
The legislation was enacted in response to a 1969 Supreme Court decision 
affirming judgments of antitrust violations against two daily newspapers. That 
case, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, arose out of a time of declining 
circulations for newspapers in which many urban markets were no longer able 
to sustain multiple competitive daily newspapers. The two newspapers in the 
case, like many others across the country, had entered into a joint operating 
agreement in which they shared business operations but not editorial and news 
departments.156 But the Court held that the agreement violated the 
anticompetitive provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
In response, Congress swiftly passed the Newspaper Preservation Act of 
1970 (“NPA”), with retroactive application. The NPA exempted joint operating 
agreements between competing newspapers from the otherwise generally 
applicable antitrust laws. The express purpose of the legislation was to help one 
type of speaker—the “newspaper press.” Congress stated that it was acting in the 
public’s interest of “maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially 
independent and competitive in all parts of the United States.”157 While the 
ultimate success of the NPA as a policy initiative has been criticized, two lower 
courts upheld its constitutionality in separate legal challenges.158 
In addition to official legislation, the Court has supported other, more 
informal ways the government has advantaged the press over other speakers. We 
see this plainly in the area of access. Preferential access to government 
information, meetings, and places ties directly to speech.159 And while the Court 
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has held that the press does not have a heightened constitutional right of access, 
it also has never expressed concern with government actors choosing to grant 
preferential access to the press. 
At every level of federal, state, and local government, public officials 
routinely provide the press with special rights of access to government-
controlled information and places.160 They do this by issuing special press access 
to government buildings, non-public spaces, press conferences, press secretaries, 
press pools, press galleries, press planes, executions, crime and disaster scenes, 
and military operations.161 As long as the process for distributing the necessary 
credentials is reasonable and not viewpoint-based, the courts have uniformly 
upheld this type of preferential treatment.162 
Even the Supreme Court has a credentialing policy that confers upon 
certain members of the press “privileges that journalists find helpful, including 
access to seats in the Courtroom during Court sessions; use of the pressroom 
facilities and office resources; assigned personal work space; and access to the 
Court building after normal business hours.”163 The Court’s Public Information 
Office also provides “credentialed reporters with information and guidance, 
beyond what is provided to the public, that facilitates their work.”164 According 
to its policy guidelines, the Court’s Public Information Office typically awards 
press passes to “full-time professional journalists employed by media 
organizations that have records of substantial and original news coverage of the 
Court.”165 But, the guidelines note, the decision to award a press pass will not 
include consideration of any content-based factors.166 
To risk stating the obvious, the Court’s press credentialing policy is an 
excellent example of a government regulation that significantly favors the press 
over other types of speakers. Seating for a Supreme Court oral argument is a 
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(upholding the city of Los Angeles’s denial of a press pass to the petitioner publisher because “[t]here 
is no constitutional requirement that Respondent show uniform treatment to all publications or news 
media in issuing Press Passes, the only requirement being that there be a reasonable basis for the 
classification imposed”). 
 163. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR 
ISSUING SUPREME COURT PRESS CREDENTIALS (2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/Media_Credential_Requirements_And_Procedures_Fe
bruary_2015_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5FB-KEQ2]. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (“The PIO makes no assessment of the content or quality of a journalist’s coverage in the 
credentialing process.”). 
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notoriously competitive enterprise.167 It is also a zero-sum game; each journalist 
who is allowed in means another non-press speaker will not get a seat. The 
Court’s credentialing policy thus leads directly to many non-press speakers being 
shut out of the proceedings (which, also notoriously, are not broadcast outside 
the courtroom).168 Transcripts and audio recordings of oral arguments and 
opinion announcements are released hours, days, or even months later,169 leaving 
a crucial interim period in which only certain favored speakers have the 
necessary information to speak about the oral arguments.170 Thus, in the words 
of its opinion in Citizens United, the Court itself regularly “identifies certain 
preferred speakers” for favored treatment and, in the process, restricts the ability 
of others to speak by “taking the right to speak from some and giving it to 
others.”171 
The Court also has praised this practice of preferential press access to 
limited-space proceedings in other contexts. In Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, the Court held that the press and the public have a constitutional right 
of access to criminal trials. While not treating the press differently for its 
constitutional analysis, the opinion acknowledged the limited capacity of many 
courtrooms and stated that there may be a need for “preferential seating for media 
representatives.”172 Thus, once again, the Court suggested that government 
actors, like judges, can choose to favor the press over other speakers. 
The many and varied statutes and policies in which the government treats 
(or has treated) the press differently than other speakers are telling. They 
represent a long tradition in which government actors have, often with the 
express approval of the Court, exercised their abilities to protect and privilege 
the press. 
 
 167. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, Not All Must Rise, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/standing_in_line_for_ 
supreme_court_gay_marriage_arguments_draw_crowd_days.html [https://perma.cc/N3YQ-PMRN] 
(discussing the difficulty and expense of witnessing important Supreme Court arguments). 
 168. See Sonja R. West, The Monster in the Courtroom, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1953 (2012). 
 169. Transcripts of oral arguments are released daily, audio weekly. Audio of bench statements 
are released the beginning of the following term. Transcripts and Recordings of Oral Arguments, SUP. 
CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/availabilityoforalargumenttranscripts.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/W8YG-L7QJ]. 
 170. See Adam Liptak, Justice Thomas Talks; People Listen: Reporter’s Notebook, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/insider/justice-thomas-talks-people-listen-
reporters-notebook.html (Journalist describes his struggle to cover the story of Justice Clarence Thomas 
breaking his decade-long silence on the bench since the reporter was not in the courtroom at the time, 
and stating “but what could I write? I had not heard the questions, and a preliminary transcript would 
not be available until, as it turned out, 12:15 p.m.”). 
 171. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 172. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582 n.18 (1980). 
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III. 
THE NONDISCRIMINATION VIEW AND OUR TRADITION OF PRESS FAVORITISM 
The view that the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
engaging in speaker-based classifications of the press is a sharp departure from 
our past and current practice. Rather than forbid such distinctions, the Court 
repeatedly has allowed and encouraged a wide range of special laws for the press. 
In doing so, the Court has necessarily allowed non-press speakers to be 
disfavored relative to press speakers; in other words, it has condoned speaker 
discrimination. 
Yet legislatures’ differential treatment of media and non-media speakers 
appears to be entirely at odds with the Court’s argument in Citizens United that 
it is constitutionally suspect for the news media to be given special rights or 
protections. For the nondiscrimination view to be correct, there must be a way to 
reconcile the theory with the long tradition of press favoritism or else all of these 
press-favoring statutes and Court precedents are wrong. 
It is somewhat difficult to parse out exactly how proponents of the 
nondiscrimination view reconcile the Court’s longstanding embrace of press-
favoring laws with their theory, because they rarely discuss it. Indeed, only 
Professors McConnell and Volokh have addressed the issue at all, and even they 
only did so in passing. In this Section, however, I strive to understand the 
nondiscrimination theory’s relationship with our robust tradition of press 
favoritism. 
The primary argument regarding how the nondiscrimination theory 
comports with our history of press-favoring laws appears to be that there is a 
difference between laws that provide benefits only to certain speakers on the one 
hand and laws that place limits only on certain speakers on the other. In Professor 
Volokh’s words: “It is ‘[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker 
that are presumptively condemned by Citizens United, not benefits for certain 
classes of speakers.”173 Professor McConnell likewise suggested that “[w]hen 
expanding [First Amendment] protection, legislatures are entitled to draw lines 
that might not be permissible in the case of abridgements.”174 Thus, both scholars 
seem to suggest that the laws discussed in Part II are constitutional, because they 
do not restrict or abridge the speech of non-press speakers. They would contend 
that these laws instead provide benefits or expand the rights of press speakers. 
The former, the argument goes, is unconstitutional while the latter is not. 
 
 173. Eugene Volokh, Unradical: “Freedom of the Press” as the Freedom of All to Use Mass 
Communications Technology, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2012) (second emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). Professor Volokh was responding in this piece to Professor Randall Bezanson’s assertion that 
the Citizens United ruling called into question a host of legislatively granted press regulations because 
“[s]uch legislative discrimination (against non-media or non-news corporations) would constitute 
discrimination on the basis of the identity or class of speakers and thus be flatly unconstitutional under 
Citizens United . . . .” Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1263–64. 
 174. McConnell, supra note 4, at 441 (emphasis added). 
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Another distinction they appear to propose, although admittedly less 
clearly, is that it is different for a law to restrict a speaker’s end-stage speech—
the final expression or publication of a message—than it is for a law merely to 
boost another speaker’s ability to gather and report information. McConnell, for 
example, stated that only laws that involve “publication of opinion” and not those 
that “focus on the newsgathering function” raise speaker-based discrimination 
issues.175 Similarly, Volokh contended that the Citizens United Court was 
focused on “the constitutionality of restrictions on otherwise protected speech,” 
but it was not concerned with “legislation offering generally available subsidies 
or other benefits.”176 This suggests that there is a type of means-ends distinction 
for speaker classifications: it is acceptable for the government to subsidize only 
some speakers’ means or ability to engage in expression, but it is unacceptable 
to restrict only some speakers’ end-stage or final message. 
Neither of these distinctions, however, fares well under closer examination. 
They do not support the Court’s decision in Citizens United and conflict with 
Supreme Court precedent. 
An initial problem with accepting these distinctions is that under this view, 
the campaign spending law in Citizens United—at least in terms of how it treats 
media corporations versus other corporations—would likely have been 
constitutional.177 The law’s media exemption is best characterized as an 
allowable benefit to a select group. The federal law applied broadly to all 
corporations, including for-profit and non-profit, as well as to unions. The media 
exemption, however, covered only a relatively small number of press 
speakers.178 Usually an exemption from an otherwise generally applicable 
regulation is viewed as a benefit to that group, not as a burden to the others.179 
But, contrary to what the nondiscrimination theory would suggest, the Court 
declared the media exemption to be unconstitutional speaker discrimination and 
not a constitutionally acceptable press benefit. 
The second means-ends argument also does not explain the outcome in 
Citizens United, because the campaign finance law regulation did not restrict 
end-stage expression. Citizens United, the corporation, was always free to 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Volokh, supra note 173, at 1279 (emphasis added). 
 177. The analysis of treating corporate speakers differently than individual or non-corporate 
speakers, of course, might differ and is not the focus of this article. 
 178. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (2012) (defined as “any news story, commentary, or editorial 
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or 
candidate”). 
 179. The Court has only expressed concern with laws granting exemptions to some speakers 
when the number of speakers not exempted was small. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983) (holding that a tax on ink and paper that 
exempted the first $100,000 was unconstitutional, “because it targets a small group of newspapers”). 
That was not the case in Citizens United. 
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engaged in unlimited speech about any message whatsoever.180 No speaker was 
ever gagged and no message ever “banned.”181 The issue in the case, as Justice 
Stevens explained in his dissent, was “how, not if” the corporation could pay to 
transmit its speech.182 There was no restriction on “publication of opinion.” 
Citizens United’s expressive message as such was never restricted. Thus the 
regulation in Citizens United, which addressed which funds may be used during 
what time period to pay for speech, is better characterized as one that affects the 
means of speaking, and not the end-stage speech itself. 
A. The Benefits-Burdens Distinction 
The arguments on how to reconcile the nondiscrimination view with our 
press favoring history are also inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Let 
us return to the first claim that there is a constitutional line between giving 
benefits to some speakers, which is allowable, and placing burdens on other 
speakers, which is not. 
With this argument, the proponents of the nondiscrimination interpretation 
are essentially arguing that the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional 
baseline of expressive rights below which the government may not restrict 
speakers’ speech based solely on their identities.183 But the legislatures, they 
suggest, are nonetheless free to expand the expressive privileges and protections 
of certain groups of speakers (like the press) beyond this baseline. This argument 
is reminiscent of the so-called “ratchet theory” proposed by Justice William 
Brennan in which he contended that under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress has the power to expand rights protected under the 
Amendment but could not dilute them.184 
The difficulty, however, is that what seems like a benefit to some speakers 
can look an awful lot like a burden to other speakers and vice versa.185 The Court, 
in fact, has noted as much in its cases involving selective taxation of the press. 
Take the decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
 
 180. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that Citizens United could have used other funds to broadcast its message 
“wherever and whenever it wanted to”). 
 181. See id. (“Neither Citizens United’s nor any other corporation’s speech has been ‘banned.’”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Bezanson, supra note 48, at 1263 (suggesting Volokh’s argument amounts to “a one-
way rule, permitting legislative exemptions for the media or news organizations under the First 
Amendment, yet denying that the First Amendment allows them to be treated differently as a class of 
corporations fully protected by the First Amendment”). 
 184. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). The Court later rejected this theory 
in the Section 5 context. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528–29 (1997). 
 185. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of deciding when speech is or is not 
being restricted by relying “upon the now-discredited faith in some form of preexisting baseline”); see 
also C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 978 (2007) (“[A]ny notion that suppression (treated as unacceptable) differs 
from promotion (treated as acceptable) also requires a baseline.”). 
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Commissioner of Revenue186 as an example. In that case, the Court considered a 
state tax scheme that exempted from a paper and ink tax the first $100,000 of the 
commodities consumed.187 The result of this tax framework was that small 
newspapers and publications received a tax subsidy, leaving only a handful of 
larger publications to pay the lion’s share of the tax.188 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained that even though the tax subsidy was 
technically a benefit given to some, it could easily “resemble more a penalty for 
a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller 
enterprises.”189 
If the ratchet theory of the Press Clause were correct, moreover, the Court 
would find no constitutional problem with laws that merely favored certain 
groups of speakers by exempting them from tax laws and would only be troubled 
by laws that levied an additional tax upon select groups of speakers. Yet the 
Court has not decided its cases that way. Instead, it has found some tax 
exemptions or subsidies affecting the press to be constitutional190 and declared 
others to be unconstitutional.191 Thus, in these tax cases, the mere fact that the 
press as a group was treated differently did not alone raise a constitutional 
problem. In fact, the Court noted specifically in Leathers v. Medlock that a 
“differential burden on speakers is insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment 
concerns.”192 
And, finally, since the Court is concerned about the government’s ability to 
distort the public debate by promoting the messages of press speakers over those 
of others,193 the ratchet theory is not a viable solution to the alleged problem. If 
marketplace distortion is the concern, it makes little difference whether the 
government’s chooses to turn up the volume on one speaker or to turn down the 
volume on another. The effect on the public debate is the same. 
 
 186. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 187. Id. at 577–78. 
 188. Id. at 578–79. 
 189. Id. at 592. 
 190. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (finding a state law that exempted 
newspapers, magazines, and satellite broadcasting services from the general sales tax, but not cable 
services, was constitutional). 
 191. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 575 (holding tax exemption from 
paper and ink tax for the first $100,000 consumed was unconstitutional). 
 192. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 452–53; see also Mabee v. White Plains Publ’g Co., 327 U.S. 178, 
184 (1946) (holding that exemptions from Fair Labor Standards Act requirements for small newspapers 
but not for larger ones were “not a ‘deliberate and calculated device’ to penalize a certain group of 
newspapers”) (citation omitted); Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193 (1946) (rejecting 
a claim that exemption of employees of small newspapers was an invalid classification). 
 193. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352–53 (2010) (suggesting that upholding the 
media exemption would allow a corporation that owns a media outlet “to advance its overall business 
interest,” but a corporation without a media outlet “would be forbidden to speak or inform the public 
about the same issue” and stating that this would violate the First Amendment). 
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B. The Means-Ends Distinction 
The means-ends rationale for distinguishing the vast number of press-
favoring laws also does not hold up under close analysis. This is the contention 
that only regulations affecting end-stage speech raise constitutional concerns and 
not those that merely subsidize a speaker’s ability to speak. 
The Court has never asserted that the government cannot use speaker 
classifications that affect end-stage speech but may use them to confer subsidies 
and benefits on the means of speaking. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.,194 for example, the Court explicitly declared that the 
government can favor the press even as to end-stage speech. It stated, albeit in 
dicta, that a state legislature could allow members of the press to broadcast a 
performer’s entire act while, at the same time, prohibiting other (non-press) 
speakers from doing the same.195 In other words, the Court saw no problem with 
the government holding non-press speakers liable for rights of publicity 
violations if they broadcast the performance, even if it did not hold press 
speakers liable for airing the exact same end-stage content. In fact, a host of 
regulations involving intellectual property rights allow press speakers to express 
end-stage messages that are restricted for other speakers.196 Under the 
nondiscrimination approach, however, these types of restriction would be 
unconstitutional. 
Similarly, the Court has upheld restrictions on the end-stage speech of 
commercial speakers that would not be constitutional if they were applied to the 
press. That is, under current law, there is no First Amendment violation when 
the government regulates a commercial speaker’s message even though it could 
not regulate a press speaker’s ability to express the exact same message.197 Thus 
the determination of whether a particular message can be regulated as 
commercial speech or not, in the words of Professor C. Edwin Baker, does not 
turn on the content of the message at all, but “[r]ather, it [is] something about the 
identity of the speaker”198 that determines whether the law applies. 
 
 194. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 195. Id. at 578–79 (holding that while the press had no constitutional privilege to broadcast the 
entire performance without the actor’s permission, the state “may as a matter of its own law privilege 
the press in the circumstances of this case”). 
 196. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (excluding “[a]ll forms of news reporting 
and news commentary” from trademark dilution regulations); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1448.01(C)(3) 
(2017) (excluding news reporting and news commentary from liability for a trademark dilution claim); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213(c)(3) (West 2017) (same); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/65(b)(3) (2017) 
(same). 
 197. Baker, supra note 185, at 1006–08; see also id. at 1007 (“Those not involved in market 
transactions promoted by the restricted speech—that is, individuals, or consumer and other public 
interest groups, or newspapers—have always been left free to communicate.”); id. at 1008 n.215 (giving 
examples of cases in which the exact same content was protected when published by the press but 
regulated later when published by commercial speakers). 
 198. Id. at 1007. 
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Another problem with this means-ends distinction is that it implies that only 
end-stage speech raises First Amendment interests. Because if acts of 
newsgathering and speech production (the “means” of speech) do not trigger the 
alleged constitutional ban on speaker discrimination, then logic would suggest 
that it is because these acts have no free expression significance. The 
implications for drawing such a constitutional line would be serious and 
contradict Supreme Court precedent.199 There could be no recognized First 
Amendment interest in information gathering such as access to judicial 
proceedings or government controlled documents or the ability to record law 
enforcement officers. Likewise, there would be no First Amendment defense to 
government taxations schemes that favor or disfavor the tools or equipment used 
to produce speech such as paper and ink, film, amplification equipment or their 
modern equivalents. It would also raise doubts about the constitutionality of 
many of the existing protections for the press that do not involve end-stage 
speech such as safeguards against government subpoenas and seizures.200 
Contrary to the suggestions of the nondiscrimination view proponents, the 
Court has never focused on whether the regulation is a burden or a benefit or on 
whether it involves the ends or means of speech. In the next Part, I examine the 
factors that the Court has focused on when considering press-favoring laws—
those relating to the unique functions of the press. The connection between press 
function and press identity is key to understanding the constitutionality of press 
favoritism. 
IV. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESS FAVORITISM 
Adopting the nondiscrimination view of the Press Clause is a dangerous 
road to travel. If the Constitution prohibits laws that treat the press differently 
than other speakers, then the numerous press-protective laws outlined in Part II 
cannot stand, because they favor the press’s right or ability to speak. There is no 
viable way to limit the nondiscrimination view such that it would not apply to 
any law or regulation that gives the press speakers an advantage over other 
speakers in their capacities to speak. It also directly conflicts with our long-held 
tradition of protecting press freedom by preferencing those who are doing the 
traditional and essential Fourth Estate work of checking the government and the 
powerful, while broadly informing the public on newsworthy matters. 
 
 199. See cases cited at supra note 159. 
 200. It would also bring into question the argument that the Press Clause merely protects the 
technology of publishing, since the printing press is clearly a means or tool of speech. See Volokh, supra 
note 4, at 463 (“[P]eople during the Framing era likely understood the [Press Clause] as fitting the press-
as-technology model”); see also Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 1035 (“Press Clause protects technology—
in 1791 the printing press, today of course many other things as well—used to produce communications 
intended for later mass dissemination.”). 
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This is not to suggest that the goal of seeking equal treatment by avoiding 
speaker discrimination is not important. But the problem is that the value of 
protecting the structural role of the press and the value of avoiding speaker 
discrimination are simply not always compatible. In some situations, a 
nondiscrimination view of the Press Clause, however appealing in theory, comes 
at the cost of weakening government scrutiny and impairing the flow of 
information to the public. In these situations, the nondiscrimination theory would 
force the government to choose between protecting all speakers equally or not 
protecting any of them, and all too often it will decide on balance to protect no 
one.201 
Thus, we must decide whether there are some instances in which we choose 
to protect the structural, information-producing value of press freedom over the 
nondiscrimination principle of speaker equality.202 In the Speech Clause context, 
it might make sense to favor speaker equality over our desire to maximize public 
information.203 One of the many recognized values of free speech is the 
individual right to engage in expression for personal autonomy and self-
fulfillment. If some speakers are given benefits in that endeavor that others are 
not, our basic tenets of individual equality are challenged. But in the Press Clause 
context, as we have seen, constitutional history, text, and precedent all tell us 
that it is the protection of the structural press functions, rather than speaker 
autonomy, that is paramount. Thus, in a face-off between speaker equality with 
the press and maximization of public information flow, the Press Clause made 
the decision for us—and it chose the latter. 
How do we know what these structural press values are and how strongly 
they should be protected? We know because the Supreme Court has told us. 
While the Court has been reluctant to embrace distinct constitutional rights and 
protections for the press, it has, nonetheless, frequently recognized and 
celebrated the unique role the press play in our constitutional democracy. 
 
 201. See West, supra note 67, at 1056 (“Ironically, the more vigorously that judges, scholars, and 
press advocates fight for broadly held press rights, the less likely it is that these protections will 
materialize.”). 
 202. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1807 n.15 (1999) (“To the extent that many constitutional rights are 
best understood as tools for realizing various common or collective or public goods, rather than in more 
individualistic terms, the content of rights depends on how the relevant public good ought best be 
understood.”); see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive 
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 730 (1998) (discussing the concept of 
“structural conception of rights”). 
 203. See West, supra note 67, at 1056 (explaining how constitutional overprotection makes sense 
in the free speech context but not necessarily in the free press context.) Whether there is reason for the 
Court to embrace an antidiscrimination stance (even, perhaps, at the expense of maximizing 
communicative expression) in situations not involving the press is outside the scope of this article. See 
John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (2005) (“If speech maximization were 
the First Amendment’s primary value, we would do better in some settings to allow government to 
discriminate among messages, rather than encouraging it to prohibit all speech simply to avoid some 
objectionable speech.”). 
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Ultimately, the Court has concluded that the press has an “historic, dual 
responsibility in our society.”204 In another piece, I reviewed the Court’s 
discussions of the role of the press and identified two constitutional functions 
that the Court has emphasized of the press qua press.205 The first is the press’s 
role as surrogate for and conduit of news to the public.206 The second is its work 
to check the government and the powerful.207 
This Part explains why recognizing these core structural press functions is 
crucial to fulfilling the constitutional promise of the Press Clause and how these 
organizing concepts should inform consideration of press-favoring laws. These 
twin press functions both help us to identify the speakers who are fulfilling the 
structural roles of the press and to guide our analysis as to which press-favoring 
laws and regulations comport with First Amendment doctrine.208 Keeping the 
focus on the press’s constitutionally recognized functions gives us assurances 
that while press-favoring laws may not be equal, they promote the public 
welfare. 
A. Press Identity and Press Function 
The Court in Citizens United did not declare that the First Amendment 
prohibits all speaker classifications. It acknowledged that in a number of prior 
cases it upheld laws that treated some groups of speakers differently from others, 
such as students,209 prisoners,210 soldiers,211 and government employees.212 The 
 
 204. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984); see also id. (stating 
that these responsibilities are “reporting information and . . . bringing critical judgment to bear on public 
affairs”). 
 205. See West, supra note 9, at 750. 
 206. See id. at 750–53. 
 207. See id. 
 208. These functions also may call for unique constitutional rights and protections for press 
speakers. This Article, however, is focused on the ability of the government to classify press speakers 
for special treatment. For a discussion on possible constitutional protection for the press, see generally 
West, supra note 7. 
 209. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“Surely it is a highly 
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse.”); see also id. at 685 (observing that allowing this speech “would undermine the school’s 
basic educational mission”). 
 210. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (“It is clearly not 
irrational to conclude that individuals may believe what they want, but that concerted group activity, or 
solicitation therefor, would pose additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of 
the State’s penal institutions. The ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings, therefore, was 
rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration.”). 
 211. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“While the members of the military are not 
excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military 
community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections.”). 
 212. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564–65 (1973) (“It 
seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those 
working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather 
than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law 
2018] FAVORING THE PRESS 129 
Court distinguished those cases, however, by claiming that they involved 
situations in which the Court was protecting a recognizable “interest in allowing 
governmental entities to perform their functions.”213 
Thus governmental function separates prohibited speaker classifications 
from those that are allowed. It is debatable, of course, whether this analytical 
touchstone focused on promoting governmental function explains the result in 
Citizens United. The Court arguably could have concluded that in order for the 
elected branches of government to perform their representative function of 
reflecting the will of the people, there need to be limitations on the ability of 
powerful corporations to exert excessive influence on elections.214 
Yet the Court in Citizens United was clearly on to something when it 
suggested that speaker identity and function are inescapably intertwined and that 
the function served by the class of speakers is of central importance when 
explaining whether speaker-based categorizations are appropriate. As the Court 
noted, it has recognized the ability of the government to identify and classify 
some groups of speakers based on the functions they serve. But rather than 
support the Court’s holding that media corporations cannot be treated differently, 
these other speaker-classification cases suggest the exact opposite. 
It is specifically because members of the press serve important 
constitutionally recognized functions that the government may treat them 
differently than other speakers. The distinctive characteristic of press speakers is 
their shared engagement in particular constitutionally valued functions, which 
the Supreme Court has identified as checking the government and the powerful, 
and informing the populace on matters of public concern.215 As discussed earlier, 
courts have upheld and even encouraged the enactment of press-favoring laws 
precisely because they assist the press in performing these valued tasks. 
Granted, speaker classifications of students, members of the military, and 
government employees differ from those involving the press in a significant 
way.216 In those cases, the Court has concluded that in order to function 
effectively, government institutions need to regulate or perhaps even silence 
 
and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party 
or group or the members thereof.”). 
 213. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010). 
 214. See generally Schauer & Pildes, supra note 202 (suggesting that campaign finance laws can 
satisfy the First Amendment if they were passed with the goal of furthering certain structural 
justifications such as reducing the influence of wealth). 
 215. See West, supra note 9, at 749–55 (discussing the unique constitutional functions of the 
press). 
 216. Classifications involving press speakers also differ from those involving students, members 
of the military, and federal employees, because they have a constitutional basis. Another example of a 
constitutionally recognized protection for a particular group of speakers is the Speech or Debate Clause. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing in part that “for any Speech or Debate in either House, . . . 
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place”). The Court has interpreted 
this privilege broadly based, again, on a concept of allowing legislators to fulfill their intended functions. 
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to the 
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good.”). 
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speakers. The argument is that public schools, the military, and various 
government offices simply cannot do their work without some ability to control 
the speech of students, soldiers, or employees. Their function requires obedience, 
efficiency, and discipline.217 
With the press, however, the effective check of government often requires 
expanding press freedoms and protections. But whether increasing or decreasing 
expressive rights, the differential treatment is still tied to function. When the 
government enacts press-favoring laws, it does so precisely because the press 
strengthens our democracy by checking the government218 and promoting a 
robust democratic civic discourse. These laws recognize that the public must be 
armed with newsworthy information in order for the process of effective self-
government to function in the manner envisioned by the Framers.219 
Recognizing the unique constitutional functions of the press is key both to 
understanding and protecting the vital structural role the press serves. Laws and 
regulations that favor the press are at least presumptively valid, for the simple 
reason that they further the goal of a properly functioning government, which 
requires a vibrant and independent press. Press-favoring laws do exactly what 
the Citizens United Court recognized speaker-classifications should do—enable 
the government to function effectively. Singling out the press for special 
treatment does not raise constitutional issues as long as there is a sufficient 
connection between the right or protection and the unique functions of the press. 
Indeed, the vital work of press speakers has always been interwoven with 
the regulations that favor them.220 The laws and regulations discussed above 
 
 217. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“The fundamental necessity for obedience, 
and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military 
that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”). 
 218. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (noting the importance of free speech and press in checking governmental 
power). 
 219. Dean Robert C. Post describes this effect as “democratic competence.” POST, supra note 27, 
at 33–34; see also Anderson, supra note 139, at 527 (“My own view is that the starting point ought to 
be something close to Robert Post’s conception of public discourse: that the system of freedom of 
expression ought to favor speech that facilitates the making of democratic accommodations within a 
culturally heterogeneous state. He views public discourse as a central value in First Amendment thinking 
generally, but it can also be seen as central to freedom of the press specifically.”); Akilah N. Folami, 
Using the Press Clause to Amplify Civic Discourse Beyond Mere Opinion Sharing, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 
269, 314 (2013) (arguing that the Press Clause could provide the constitutional framework to promote 
democratic competence); Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and 
the Freedom of the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529, 535–36 (2012) (discussing the potential ways Post’s 
theory of “democratic competence” might expand or narrow press freedoms). 
 220. Focusing on the unique function of the press also explains the validity of laws that place 
additional requirements on press speakers but not on non-press speakers. In certain circumstances, the 
Court has upheld regulations that mandated the media include certain content. For example, in order to 
receive second-class postal rates, newspapers and periodicals are required to make certain disclosures 
including the identity of the editors and publishers. See 39 U.S.C. § 3685 (2012); Postal Service 
Appropriations Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-336, 37 Stat. 539, 553–54 (1912) (requiring newspapers 
and periodicals receiving second-class postal rates to make certain disclosures); see also Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653–56 (1994) (upholding “must carry” law requiring cable companies 
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illustrate that relationship in action. The fact that press speakers serve as the eyes 
and ears of the community,221 for example, justifies allowing reporters special 
access to government places, meetings, or information, at least in contexts where 
disruption, overcrowding, and chaos require a winnowing of potential 
information receivers. The commitment of the press to act as watchdogs of 
government and other centers of societal power222 supports the need for special 
protections from government searches and subpoenas. And the unique history of 
oppression directed at the press by hostile government actors explains the special 
scrutiny of tax schemes that target or burden the news media.223 
B. The Limits of Press Favoritism 
Upholding press-favoring laws, however, does not mean there are no 
limitations on the government’s ability to single out the press for support. 
Because the justification for such laws is grounded in constitutionally recognized 
press functions, only laws and regulations that advance these functions should 
be upheld. Of particular importance, courts can and should police government 
regulations that favor the press for content-based discrimination.224 Laws that 
 
to include broadcast channels); Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (upholding 
requirement that a broadcast licensee “share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy 
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his 
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves”). 
 221. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (“Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth 
from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a 
sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.”); see also id. at 586 n.2 
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief 
beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of interested citizens, and funnels 
information about trials to a large number of individuals”); id. at 600 & n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“[E]very courtroom has a finite physical capacity, and there may be occasions when not 
all who wish to attend a trial may do so. . . . In such situations, representatives of the press must be 
assured access.”). 
 222. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 
(1989) (recognizing the that the press allows the public to learn “what their government is up to”) 
(quotation marks omitted); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves 
and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and 
as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the 
people whom they were selected to serve.”); West, supra note 9, at 753 (“In addition to conveying 
newsworthy information to the public, it has long been accepted as a basic assumption of our political 
system that [t]he press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse and will often serve as an 
important restraint on government.”) (internal footnotes and quotations omitted). 
 223. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245–49 (1936) (discussing this history). 
 224. See Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised on mistrust of 
governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or 
viewpoints.”); but see Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona and the Rise of the Anti-
Classificatory First Amendment, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (challenging the application of strict 
scrutiny to all facially content-based speech regulations); Eliza Collins, Trump Adds ‘Washington Post’ 
to Banned List, USA TODAY (June 13, 2016, 5:58 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/06/13/trump-washington-post-banned-
list/85842316 [https://perma.cc/H6DX-7272] (discussing then-Republican nominee Donald Trump’s 
decision to revoke the press credentials of the Washington Post because of its coverage of his campaign). 
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favored certain press speakers by burdening other press speakers, moreover, 
would also raise heightened concerns because specialized press protections, 
absent some special justification, logically should extend to the press as a 
whole.225 
Because press speaker identity is tied to press function, specialized 
protection of the press should only apply when a relevant press function is in the 
picture. In this regard, a speaker might be identified as the press in some 
situations but not in others. The speaker’s status would depend on whether she 
was engaged in the constitutional press functions at the relevant time. For 
example, a reporter might have a special privilege not to testify about witnessing 
a possible crime while engaged in undercover reporting at a local school. But 
that same person might not have a privilege if he witnessed a possible crime after 
work while simply attending his child’s recital at that same school.226 This sort 
of sensitivity to identity-shifting is not new. It is found in the Court’s work in 
other contexts that involve a function-centered analysis of specialized speaker 
identity. Rules governing the speech rights of government employees or 
members of the military, for example, will no longer apply once the speaker 
leaves the job or is discharged from service. At this point, these speakers are no 
longer engaged in the key function (working for the federal government or 
serving in the military) that justifies the classification.227 A particularly good 
analogy to press speakers is the identity of student speakers, whose status might 
shift multiple times throughout the day depending on whether they are at 
school,228 at home, in class, in the hallways, or participating in a school-
 
 225. Although the Court has held that the government may intervene if private press speakers are 
acting to suppress other private press speakers. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 
(1945) (finding that the Sherman Act could constitutionally be applied to news organizations engaging 
in anticompetitive acts and stating that “[t]he First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the 
contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunity”). 
 226. See, e.g., Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 858–61 (N.J. App. Div. 2010) 
(finding that a woman who worked as a freelance journalist could not claim protection under the 
reporter’s shield law for statements she made merely as a participant in an Internet chat room). 
 227. Legislators also lose their speaker-based protections granted by the Speech or Debate Clause 
when they are not engaged in congressional business or once they are no longer in office. See United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515–16 (1972) (“In every case thus for before this Court, the Speech 
or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process—the due 
functioning of the process.”). 
 228. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding 
nondisruptive Free Speech rights by students in schools). 
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sponsored229 or school-sanctioned activity.230 As the student moves throughout 
her day, so do the differing rules and regulations that govern her speech.231 
Focusing on speaker function is also vital, because it is only through 
function that we can determine which speakers are members of the press. Press 
speakers are, by definition, those speakers who are fulfilling press functions. 
These speakers tend to possess distinct qualities. Press speakers have a proven 
record of reaching a broad audience through regular publication or broadcast. 
They devote time, resources, and specialized skills to gathering and reporting the 
news. They bring knowledge and expertise to the subject matter and place 
information in context. The link between function and identity to support press-
favoring laws, moreover, builds upon itself. Press-favoring laws give certain 
advantages that will further the public good to those speakers who have 
demonstrated that they will use these privileges for the public good. 
Yet, for many, the concept of the government bestowing special advantages 
only upon certain speakers is troubling. Doing so smacks of elitism and raises 
concerns about government partiality toward certain non-government speakers. 
Critics of press exceptionalism who claim that favoring the press violates 
principles of equality, however, are simply looking for that equality in the wrong 
place. The relevant question about equality is not whether all speakers enjoy the 
same rights and protections at all times,232 but whether all speakers have the same 
opportunity to be identified as a press speaker and, if so, receive the same rights 
and protections enjoyed by other members of the press. Advancements in mass 
communication technology and broadening access to the internet increasingly 
ensure expansive opportunities to be identified as the press.233 And judicial 
scrutiny of press regulations for content neutrality and the uniform treatment of 
press speakers serves to confirm that gaining that status will prove to be 
practically meaningful.234 
 
 229. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988) (distinguishing 
Tinker, finding no First Amendment violation for censoring articles in a school-sponsored student paper, 
and holding that such speech restrictions must be merely reasonable). 
 230. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (finding no First Amendment violation 
where a school censored the student’s speech at a school-sponsored class trip, where the speech 
reasonably could be seen to promote illegal drug use). 
 231. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(refusing to apply more restrictive free speech analysis to student speech that occurred off-campus and 
during non-school hours). 
 232. Again, this might be the correct inquiry if dealing with non-press speech rights. See 
generally Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2011) 
(explaining that equality of individual speech rights “reflect the autonomy of . . . speakers”). 
 233. See West, supra note 7, at 2452 (“Advances in mass communication technology, 
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 234. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
592 (1983) (observing that allowing the government “to tailor [a] tax so that it singles out a few members 
of the press” would be constitutionally suspect). Courts also police for pretextual press-specific laws 
that claim to be intended to favor the press but do not have that effect. See id. at 592 (rejecting the state’s 
argument that its goal was to implement an “‘equitable’ tax system). 
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In short, just as the Court explained in Citizens United, speaker 
classifications are justified when they relate closely to an effectively functioning 
government. For precisely this reason, laws singling out the press for special 
protections that further constitutional press functions are to be lauded, rather than 
eschewed. 
When it comes to matters involving press freedoms, the focus should be on 
maximizing information flow of newsworthy matters and effective government 
scrutiny. In some situations, those goals do not require speaker classifications, 
and in those cases all speakers can and should enjoy the same expressive 
freedom.235 In other cases, however, these interests diverge, and it is at this point 
that the government should be able to take steps to promote the values of press 
freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
In Citizens United, the Court relied on the media exemption to the 
challenged campaign finance law as the primary support for its argument that the 
law was unconstitutional speaker discrimination. This analysis is misguided. It 
is misguided both because it draws on a highly questionable reading of 
precedent, and more importantly because it raises future dangers of hobbling the 
freedom of the Fourth Estate. If followed to its logical end, viewing the Press 
Clause as a mere nondiscrimination provision threatens the vital structural role 
of the press. 
As a nation, we have a long history of embracing the special constitutional 
role of the press. And one of the primary ways Americans have expressed this is 
by passing or encouraging laws that protect and support the press beyond the 
rights recognized for other speakers. These unique protections are not granted 
lightly. They have always been determinedly content-neutral and focused on 
ways to help the press accomplish its constitutionally assigned task of serving 
the public through shared information and government scrutiny. 
A review of history, judicial precedent, and legislative practice underscores 
the error that lay at the root of Citizens United. The media exemption to the 
campaign finance law did not demonstrate the unconstitutionality of speaker 
classifications of the press. Conversely, it is clear that if there is one group of 
speakers we can with confidence treat differently from others, it is the press. 
 
 235. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that all 
speakers, not just press speakers, are protected by the actual malice standard in defamation cases brought 
by public officials engaged in official conduct). 
